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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the American public pressured
Congress to hold individual corporate employees liable for misconduct that
contributed to the collapse of the economy, adding to the most severe
economic downturn since the Great Depression. In light of this public
pressure, Congress enacted the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) which, in
part, mandates that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
other government agencies must implement strict rules for corporations
regarding corporate compliance to help prevent another financial disaster.1
* J.D. 2017, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., magna cum
laude, English and Sociology, University of Connecticut. The author would like to
express sincere gratitude to Professor Kenneth Anderson and the American University
Business Law Review executive board and staff for donating time and effort to help
prepare this Note.
1. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1019, 1049, 1056 (2012).
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Former Assistant Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates wrote a
memorandum (the “Yates Memo”) on behalf of the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) in 2015, emphasizing the continued importance of fighting
corporate fraud and other misconduct.2 Most importantly, the Yates Memo
called for individual liability of corporate officers.3 As a result of
increased regulations, statutory provisions, and the Yates Memo, the DOJ
and SEC have increased the number of actions against corporate officers.4
One easy target for these government entities is the Chief Compliance
Officer (“CCO”). Due to this increased scrutiny, seventy–four percent of
compliance professionals in public corporations and eighty–nine percent in
private corporations are either somewhat or extremely concerned about
their personal liability as a CCO.5
In the interest of self–protection, corporations in many industries are
implementing complex compliance programs and appointing CCOs to head
these operations. In fact, seventy–two percent of United States
corporations today have a CCO.6 The CCO must wear many hats
throughout the corporation, which often results in overlapping duties with
the General Counsel (“GC”), Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), and other
corporate officers.7
Corporations have chosen to deal with the complex job description of a
CCO in many different ways. Some corporations choose to clearly
differentiate the duties of the CCO and the GC by having the CCO report to
the GC; other corporations may take more drastic measures by hiring an
independent CCO to handle their compliance function.8 Depending upon
the exact role of the CCO, he or she may be a member of the C–Suite or
not.9 Because the CCO’s precise duties within the corporation may be
2. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all United
States Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015). [hereinafter Yates Memo].
3. Id. at 1-2, 4.
4. John F. Savarese, White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What to Expect in
2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/25/white-collar-and-regulatory-enforcement-
what-to-expect-in-2017/.
5. DLA PIPER’S 2016 COMPLIANCE & RISK REPORT: CCOS UNDER SCRUTINY 8
(2016).
6. State of Compliance Study 2016, PWC (2016), http://ww
w.pwc.com/us/stateofcompliance.
7. See Shon Ramey, Fauxtroversy: Combining or Separating GC and CCO
Roles?, NAVEXGLOBAL (July 14, 2014), http://www.navexglobal.com/blog/fauxtrovers
y-combining-or-separating-gc-and-cco-roles.
8. José A. Tabuena & Jennifer L. Smith, The Chief Compliance Officer Versus the
General Counsel: Friends or Foes? Tensions Can Exist Between the Two, So Define
the Roles and Learn to Strike A Balance, 8 J. Health Care Compliance 23, 25 (2006).
9. See Chief Compliance Officer: The Fourth Ingredient in a World Class Ethics
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unclear, the CCO becomes an easy scapegoat for any corporate
misconduct.10
Part II of this Article will discuss the history and evolution of the role of
a CCO within a corporation. Part III will explore the industries that
employ CCOs today and their stages of advancing compliance programs.
Part IV of this Article will address the controversy concerning the often–
conflicting roles of the CCO and GC. Finally, Part V will conclude with a
discussion of the evolving risks facing CCOs of modern corporations.
II. THEHISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE COMPLIANCE
OFFICER IN ACORPORATION
A. Foreshadowing to the 2008 Financial Crisis
Corporate GCs are historically responsible for overseeing the
compliance function of a corporation. In the past, corporations employed
the minimal standards for compliance, which established a system of
dangerously low accountability.11 However, in the twentieth century,
courts began to impose joint and several liability on corporation individuals
and agents.12 High–level officers within corporations used “reciprocal risk
shifting” to displace their risk of liability and loss to subordinate
employees; by transferring the risk of legally imposed losses back and
forth, they relied on employee indemnity to recover losses on account of
the agency while simultaneously depending on employer indemnity to
recoup losses imposed through vicarious liability.13 The resulting
“indemnification equilibrium” created an equal balance of risks, thus
allowing the corporation to escape enforcement functions for individual
liability.14
and Compliance Program, DELOITTE 3 (2015) [hereinafter Chief Compliance Officer],
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/risk/articles/the-chief-compliance-officer-cco-
the-fourth-ingredient-in-a-world-class-ethics-and-compliance-program.html.
10. See Julie Dimauro, The State of the Chief Compliance Officer in 2016, CORP.
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (May 25, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/s
tate-chief-compliance-officer-2016/.
11. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, n.251 (1999) (citing Peg. A. Schoenfelder,
Preventive Law “Marketing Tips” for Corporate Counsel, Preventive L. Rep., Fall
1995, at 19).
12. Id. at 1346.
13. Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of
Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 45–7 (1980); see Laufer, supra note 12, at 1346
(foreshadowing the issues demonstrated by the 2008 financial crisis).
14. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (1984).
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From the 1980s to early 2000s, courts and government officials pushed
for increased regulation and transparency, urging corporate entities to
monitor their employees for violations of criminal law.15 The government
began to provide incentives for corporations to separate their compliance
responsibilities from their general counsel department. For example, in the
late 1990s, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) for the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) took a stance urging for more
stringent compliance guidelines. OIG suggested that the CCO should be a
member of senior management who reports directly to the CEO and the
Board of Directors. This “free standing” permits the CCO to work
independently from other “key management positions such as general
counsel, comptroller, or chief financial officer.”16
In 2002, after the Enron, WorldCom, and several other scandals
occurred, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) appointed a task force to
“examine systemic issues relating to corporate responsibility arising out of
the unexpected and traumatic bankruptcy of Enron and other[s] which
[shook] confidence in the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure
systems applicable to public companies in the United States.”17 With
regulatory expectations rising in corporations across the world, there was
“tremendous pressure on organizations, particularly those with
international operations,” to implement compliance programs.18
In addition, in 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,
implementing “the most far reaching reform of American business
practices” in decades.19 Its reforms included enhanced corporate
responsibility and mandatory financial disclosures.20 As a result of such
15. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (expanding the
scope of the work–product doctrine in holding that companies can invoke attorney–
client privilege for communications between company lawyers and non–management
employees); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir.
1996) (“By voluntarily disclosing her attorney’s advice to a third party . . . a client is
held to have waived the privilege because the disclosure runs counter to the notion of
confidentiality.”); SEC v. Koninklijke Ahold N.V. (Royal Ahold), Litigation Release
No. 18929 (Oct. 13, 2004) (resulting in a corporation promptly taking remedial actions
including revising its internal controls and terminating employees responsible for the
wrongdoing).
16. Greg Radinsky, The Compliance Officer Conundrum: Assessing Privilege
Issues in a Health Care Setting, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTHCARE L. 1, 2 (2002).
17. J.H. CHEEK III ET AL., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK
FORCE ONCORPORATERESPONSIBILITY 3–4 (Am. Bar. Ass’n, 2003).
18. See Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 9, at 1–2.
19. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC (Oct 1, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (quoting President George W.
Bush, Speech on the Sarbanes–Oxley Act Implementation (Jul. 30, 2002)); see
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 72072 (2002).
20. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 19.
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guidance, the CCO became a “direct line to the top.” 21 The position now
entails not only collaborating with the corporation’s various sub–divisions
to ensure compliance, but communicating information about potential
wrongdoing to top officials as well.22
B. The Push Towards Modern CCOs
The 2008 collapse of financial institutions almost brought down the
world’s economic system.23 Highly respected credit rating agencies
negligently and incorrectly rated mortgage–backed securities issued by
Wall Street firms as “low risk,” or “AAA,” meaning the best and safest.24
Through subprime housing mortgages, people could now purchase real
estate out of their price range at very low interest rates. Banks and hedge
funds invested heavily in these securities, selling them to special purpose
financial vehicles.25 A rapid decline in housing values led to soaring
subprime mortgage defaults, as people were unable to pay back their loans.
The “AAA” securities lost much of their value, forcing home foreclosures
and sales. This quickly affected the prime mortgage market as well. The
special purpose vehicles that had bought the loans from the banks were
insured against defaults, so denied responsibility for any sort of
repayment.26 Banks were often unable to refinance their liabilities; thus,
the federal government had to step in to bail them out.27
After 2008, the public called for corporations to self–regulate, urging
them to adopt internal programs to regulate their internal compliance.28
There was a push for publicly traded companies to report wrongdoing
21. Alison MacDonald Duncan, Preserving the Attorney–Client Privilege in an Age
of Transparency: New Challenges for Compliance Officers and In–House Counsel,
ALH (2005), http://archive.healthlawyers.org/google/health_law_archive/program_pap
ers2/2005_COMPLIANCE/%5B2005_COMPLIANCE%5D%20104.%20Preserving%
20the%20Attorney-Client%20Privilege%20in%20an%20Age%20of%20Transparency-
%20.pdf.
22. Id.
23. The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-
are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (explaining the collapse occurred because
moneylenders carelessly provided high amounts of cheap financing to borrowers with
histories of poor credit).
24. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 122, 125–26
(2009).
25. Id. at 123, 125–126.
26. See id. at 127.
27. Id. at 122.
28. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C.L.
REV. 949, 951–52 (2009); see also Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107–204,
116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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within the company as soon as possible.29 Such demands required a
previously unheard–of degree of transparency within the corporate sector,
forcing companies to proactively implement internal investigations.30
In 2010, President Barack Obama implemented the Dodd–Frank Act,
which resulted in drastic changes to the United States financial regulatory
system, including heightened corporate governance and disclosure
requirements.31 The Dodd–Frank Act includes 16 titles and requires that
regulators create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies, and issue 22 periodic
reports.32 The Act highlights three areas of corporate governance in
financial institutions and public companies, requiring such companies to
establish risk management committees, provide additional disclosures
about their organizational structures, and allow the SEC to adopt proxy
access.33 The Dodd–Frank Act also sets up an annual SEC report and
triannual Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) audit reports to
Congress, to assess the “effectiveness” of their “internal supervisory
controls” and procedures for financial reporting.34
29. Duncan, supra note 21, at 7.
30. Id.; See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2004) (providing rules for the culpability of organizations with “Effective
Compliance and Ethics Programs”); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969,
SEC Docket (Oct. 23, 2001), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/invest
report/34-44969.htm (outlining criteria to help in assessing the extent to which a
company’s self-policing and cooperation efforts will influence its decision to bring
enforcement action); Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson to
Heads of Dep’t Components United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with
author) (expanding and revising Eric Holder’s 1999 memorandum and identifying nine
factors federal prosecutors should use in charging corporations or other business
entities including the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and
its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents); Memorandum from the
Deputy Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to All Component Heads and United States
Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (on file with author) (“Finally, in the experience of our
members and their outside counsel, companies faced with waiver requests virtually
always accede to them. In seeking to resolve the threat to the short–term best interest
of the business and its shareholders, particularly the risk of a criminal prosecution of
the company, senior corporate management do not dare lose an opportunity for
favorable treatment (or, conversely, trigger the wrath of prosecutors).”).
31. See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub.L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010).
32. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD–FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21,
2010 87 (2010).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 88.
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C. Modern CCOs: The “Moral Compass” of the Company
CCOs are not simply watchdogs for policing organizations. Instead,
CCOs are seen as “business partners, collaborators, strategists, and internal
consultants,” who add value to the company by helping decision makers
“achieve objectives within the guidelines of what is permissible.”35
Because corporate entities are now held accountable for the actions of their
subordinate employees, CCOs must implement holistic compliance
programs.
Compliance has evolved into a “universal corporate governance activity”
because of the numerous statutes and regulatory regimes.36 By having
rules that directly and indirectly require corporations to adopt programs
against internal misconduct, corporations must comply at the risk of facing
“highly punitive consequences for their failure to do so.”37 Compliance
programs are expected to address:
Portfolio management, trading practices, an adviser’s proprietary trading
and personal trading activities of supervised personnel; accuracy of
disclosures made to investors; safeguards to prevent advisory personnel
from converting or inappropriately using client assets; the creation and
maintenance of required records; marketing advisory services; processes
to value client holdings and assess fees based on those valuations; client
privacy safeguards; business continuity plans.38
The CCO must know and understand the laws and regulations to ensure
everyone in the corporation abides by these rules. A CCO’s
responsibilities may require him or her to, among other things: conduct
interviews and hold meetings with the board or directors, employees, and
other officers; detect and prevent financial malfeasance; enforce the
organization’s code of conduct; and promote integration between corporate
business operations.39 Furthermore, it is the CCO’s responsibility to create
easy–to–use protocols by which they “review compliance issues, create
internal control processes . . . ensure reports are filed promptly, and provide
training to all employees whose jobs touch on compliance in any way.”40
35. Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 9, at 4.
36. Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary
Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466–67 (2008).
37. Baer, supra note 28, at 951–952 (2009).
38. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68
Fed. Reg. 74714, 74716 (Dec. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275,
279).
39. Sally Bernstein & Andrea Falcione, What it Means to be a “Chief” Compliance
Officer: Today’s Challenges, Tomorrow’s Opportunities, PWC 2, 3 (2014), https
://www.pwc.com/mx/es/riesgos/archivo/2015-03-challenges.pdf.
40. The Growing Role of Compliance Within Banks, ROBERTWALTERS, https://ww
w.robertwalters-usa.com/career-advice/the-growing-importance-of-compliance-within-
banks.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
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To check that the corporation’s compliance program is successfully
completing these tasks, the CCO must subject the program to regular
voluntary audits.41 A corporation’s failure to have these compliance
policies and procedures may result in civil or even criminal penalties.42
The SEC requires regulated corporations to implement a compliance
program as described above. Specifically, Rule 38a–1 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)–7 of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (“Compliance Rules”) require money managers to implement
written compliance programs administered by a designated CCO.43 Rule
38a–1 states that the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of
independent directors, must approve the designation and compensation of
the CCO.44 The board may also remove the CCO from his or her position
at any time.45 The CCO reports directly to the board including furnishing
an annual written report, and must conduct the annual review of the
policies and procedures for the fund.46
Rule 206(4)–7 says the CCO should be “an individual with sufficient
knowledge of the Advisers Act, empowered with full responsibility and
authority to develop and enforce appropriate policies and procedures . . .
and [having] sufficient seniority and authority to compel others to adhere to
[them]”.47 Under this rule, the CCO conducts the annual review, considers
compliance matters that arose during previous year, appraises changes in
business activities, and evaluates new regulatory developments.48
Compliance functions are best carried out as a “free standing” process
that allows CCOs to report directly to the board.49 This process ensures
independent and objective legal review as well as financial analysis of the
corporation’s compliance efforts and activities.50 An Ernst & Young study
surveying eighty–three companies across eleven industries in four countries
concluded that the CCO’s role is best implemented as an independent
41. Id. (quoting Adrian Morrissey, Manager of the Compliance Division, Robert
Walters New York).
42. See, e.g., Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers, Rel. No. IA–2204 (Dec. 17, 2003).
43. Jeffrey S. Puretz et al., Compliance Rules as a New Enforcement Regime, ALI–
CLE 159, 163 (Nov. 2–3, 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Rel.
No. IA–2204 (Dec. 17, 2003).
48. Puretz et al., supra note 43, at 164.
49. Id.
50. Radinsky, supra note 16, at 2.
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officer who reports directly to the board and has no employment stake in
the corporation.51
1. CCOs in Action
Compliance officers are found in healthcare and financial services
corporations, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, money center banks,
insurance companies, and most recently in aerospace.52 While the
healthcare industry began implementing compliance programs long ago,
recently, the banking sector has become the epicenter for driving cultural
change when addressing a corporation’s duty to self–regulate.53 In 1991,
the United States Sentencing Commission articulated its first rendition of
the elements of an effective compliance program, and the government
promised to reduce corporate penalties if a corporation can show it had a
good compliance program in place.54 The Sentencing Commission’s
current factors for effective compliance practices are: (1) rules, (2) high
level engagement and appropriate delegation, (3) diligence in hiring, (4)
communication and training, (5) monitoring and testing, (6) alignment of
incentives, and (7) appropriate remediation.55 On the other hand, in the
insurance industry, seventy–eight percent of insurance firms still have a GC
overseeing the compliance function, not because this is effective, but
because it is the newest industry to begin implementing rules calling for
compliance programs headed by CCOs.56
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CCO AND THE GENERALCOUNSEL
Some large publicly traded corporations have distinct Compliance and
Legal departments because there is a clear line between the roles of
51. See Ernst & Young, Best in Show: Cross Industry Corporate Compliance
Survey Results, BUS. RISK. SERVS. 1, 5–7 (2003) (exploring how large corporations
have implemented corporate compliance programs, identifying key indicators of
corporate compliance activities, and validating the applicability of those measures in
companies across various industries. The study also determined that a successful CCO
informs all executive officers of the requirements for corporate compliance and ethical
business practices).
52. Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 9, at 3; Ernst & Young, supra note 51
(“financial services and aerospace industries had the highest average industry scores”).
53. Cynthia Dow & Jason Lim, How the Chief Compliance Officer Role is
Transforming Across Financial Services, RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES (Apr. 28,
2016), http://www.russellreynolds.com/en/Insights/thought-leadership/Documents/R60
5016-rr0063-%20CCO%20in%20FS%20v16.pdf.
54. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2084–85 (2016).
55. U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINESMANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015).
56. Dow et al., supra note 53.
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compliance officers and general counsel.57 The role of the GC tends to be
broader than that of the CCO. The GC “typically occupies multiple roles
within the organization” and must be able to both delegate to outside
counsel and inform the corporation of current law in a variety of areas. 58
The GC is often a high–paid member of senior management, who is closely
involved in high–level strategic decisions as an adviser.59 The CCO, in
contrast, is generally a freestanding or partially autonomous officer who
develops programs to ensure adherence to regulations, and can present
objective opinions on the legality of corporate practices to management, the
board, or law enforcement. As one scholar noted, “[l]awyers say what you
can do and compliance officers say what you should do.”60
The CCO does not act as in–house lawyer representing the company, but
rather manages corporate ethics by taking steps to prevent, detect, and
respond to compliance transgressions.61 As one CCO explains:
Compliance officers need to be very good at figuring out what the law is
and explaining it to your clients . . . Compliance is getting up out of your
chair and following your clients back into their business and making sure
they really are doing all of the things that you’ve advised them to do.62
In some cases, the CCO is responsible for doing “whatever it takes to
prevent and detect misconduct.”63 This often means translating legal
advice into specific management action. CCOs work to prevent mistakes
before they happen to avoid legal issues down the line. CCOs also
implement and monitor processes to ensure established standards are met.64
Therefore, as a corporate officer, it is important for the CCO to understand
the regulations or laws that could adversely affect the company and devise
“programs, plans, strategies to adhere to the laws, while at the same time
not making it too difficult for the company to make money to do what it
does best.”65
57. See PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/about/compliance (last visited Feb. 6,
2017); GAP, INC. http://www.gapinc.com/content/gapinc/html/investors/corporate_com
pliance.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
58. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 955, 955 (2005).
59. Id. at 960.
60. Michele DeStafano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of
Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2961, 2978 (2014) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 2976.
62. Id. at 2977 (citing Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Ethics and
Compliance Officer (June 21, 2010)).
63. Tabuena et al., supra note 8, at 25.
64. Id. at 26.
65. DeStafano, supra note 60, at 2977 (citing Anonymous Telephone Interview
with Compliance Manager (May 18, 2011)).
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The CCO’s responsibilities differ from the GC because although he or
she must use legal acumen, the role also requires significant human
resource, management, communications, auditing, and internal control
training.66 The CCO and the GC should be separate but equal positions
that both instruct the CEO, Chief Financial Officer, and the Board of
Directors on a regular basis.67 If the CCO is not on equal ground with
other senior officers, it will be difficult for him to create a compliance
program that directs those officers to comply with the laws and regulations
of the industry and provide a productive business culture for the company
to thrive.68
The following sections describe three models for structuring the
relationship between the GC and CCO, and justify why companies should
adopt distinct legal and compliance departments.
A. Models for structuring the relationship between the CCO and GC.
The models for structuring the relationship between the GC and the CCO
depend primarily on the company’s size and resources.69 The first model
works for small and midsize organizations without the resources to create
an entirely new position. Under this model, the CCO and GC are combined
into one role. The advantages of this model are that since compliance
issues are inherently legal, combining the positions can be functionally and
operationally efficient.70 By making compliance into a legal matter, it is
often easier to make it seem like compliance matters are important and
warrant employees taking compliance more seriously. The disadvantages
include that government regulators worry that having the positions
combined allows “attorney–client privilege” for compliance matters that
prevents the government from being able to get information or regulate
effectively.71
In the second model, the CCO reports to the GC.72 This solves some of
the issues with checks and balances that occur when the positions are
66. Tabuena et al., supra note 8, at 26.
67. Id. at 25 (separating the jobs of CCO and GC can be beneficial because it helps
promote a “checks and balances” system).
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id. at 24 (citing OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858, 4874 (Jan. 31, 2005); see also Memorandum from
Gabriel L. Imperato, Analysis of Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel
Functions for Health Care Organizations.
70. See José A. Tabuena & Jennifer L. Smith, The Chief Compliance Officer
Versus the General Counsel: Friends or Foes? Part II Having Appropriate Checks
and Balances to Ensure Proper Oversight Is Necessary but May Spur Conflict, 8 J.
HEALTHCARECOMPLIANCE 13, 14 (2006) [hereinafter Tabuena et al., Part II].
71. Id.
72. Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that twenty–one percent of
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combined, and can be very efficient because it allows the GC to go about
his legal business and simply sign off on the CCO’s decisions regarding
corporate compliance.73 Direct reporting makes sense because they have to
work closely together in the first place. The disadvantages of this model
are that CCOs can face pressure from the GC if the GC disagrees with a
decision. This could create tension between the two positions and implies
that since the CCO is inferior to the GC, he cannot objectively monitor the
GC’s actions.74
The third model provides that the CCO and GC are independent.75
Recent changes to corporate criminal liability rules, sentencing guidelines,
and settlement patterns all appear to be pushing corporations towards
adopting independent compliance departments.76 Under this model, the
CCO is classified as a senior officer that is given respect and authority
within the corporation. As a result, the compliance department enjoys a
substantial budget, support, and access.77 The CCO is then free to monitor
the GC without worrying about job security or backlash. However, there
are times when the GC and CCO should work together. In certain
situations, the CCO may want to go to the GC for legal advice that could
help mitigate the problem before it gets out of hand. CCOs in this model
tend to develop a relationship with the GC and the board by providing
“balanced and unvarnished information.”78 This is the best way to ensure a
fair system of checks and balances within the corporation.
V. REPORTINGMISCONDUCT
Although the GC and the CCO are theoretically both protected by the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the GC has separate professional ethics obligations
that may impose restrictions on his ability to report misconduct within the
corporation. Sarbanes–Oxley encourages the disclosure of corporate fraud;
Congress enacted Section 806 specifically to encourage whistleblower
employees of publicly traded companies to report illegal activities.79
Section 806 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which was a comprehensive
attempt to identify and eradicate corporate fraud in public corporations,
CCOs report to the GC).
73. Tabuena et al., Part II, supra note 70, at 15–16.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that thirty–six percent of
CCOs stated that they report to CEO directly and twenty-one percent said they report to
board of directors).
76. DeStafano, supra note 60, at 2974–75.
77. Tabuena et al., supra note 8, at 23.
78. Id.
79. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
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protects employee whistleblowers of publicly traded companies from
retaliation.80
Under Section 806, the Department of Labor will protect employees
from retaliation upon the lodging of a whistleblower complaint against
employer. It also authorizes the Department of Justice to criminally charge
those responsible for the retaliation. A public company may not
“discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any manner
discriminate against an employee “ in response to any act the employee
took with a “reasonable belief” of violation of law.81 The whistleblower
protections afforded by Section 806 cover disclosures made to federal
regulatory agencies and law enforcement agencies, members and
committees of Congress, and agents of the employer.82
The role of the GC centers on “vigorous representation” of the corporate
client, while the CCO’s main job is to neutrally ensure corporate
compliance with applicable laws.83 The GC generally adheres to an “up
and out reporting” method, first alerting his supervisory authority within
the corporation of the violation, and only moving “out” to the board
members upon being dismissed by the supervisor.84 If the GC fails to
follow this process, he may face ABA sanctions and could even be
disbarred. In contrast, the CCO has no such disciplinary body.85 José
Tabuena and Jennifer Smith identify the Code of Ethics for Healthcare
Compliance Association, created in 1999, as the closest thing to an
overseeing entity for CCOs.86 However, this is specific to the healthcare
sector, and has no official enforcement power or legal backing.87
The GC and CCO also experience different motivations for actually
reporting. The GC, with his or her main job being “vigorous
representation” of the organization, is unlikely to feel obligated to report
further to external law enforcement authorities. I n the event the GC
chooses to report outside the organization as a whistleblower protected by
Section 806, this action implicates the confidentiality and attorney–client
80. Id. (providing protection for employees of publicly traded companies from
retaliation if provide information to government on certain types of misconduct);
Vincent Agnello & Audrey Agnello, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act Section 806: Ten Years
Later, BRCACAD. J. BUS. 19, 19–20 (2013).
81. Agnello et al., supra note 80, at 23; see Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107–204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
82. Agnello et al., supra note 80, at 23; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107–204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
83. Tabuena et al., supra note 8, at 25–6.
84. Id. at 27.
85. This discussion assumes a CCO is not a barred attorney.
86. Tabuena et al., supra note 8, at 27.
87. Id. at 27–8.
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privilege requirements he has assumed in representing the corporation as a
client. The CCO is not professionally bound to protect privileged and
confidential information, and, thus has more of a motivation to blow the
whistle on illegal corporate practices without implicating the risk of
professional discipline.
CONCLUSION
Compliance officers and compliance departments do not sit as judge and
jury over their organizations; instead, they are a resource to the
organization officers, board, and employees. CCOs should not act, and
should not be treated, as the ultimate authority within a corporation, but it
is prudent of corporate management to recognize the extent to which
compliance programs benefit corporations.88 By regulating everyday
employee compliance and acting as an in–house expert on relevant federal
regulations, CCOs effectively reduce the number of fines and penalties an
organization may face.89 For a modern–day company, a strong compliance
program is fundamental to successfully navigate the multitude of
government restrictions and limitations on corporate action.
88. See Roy Snell, Greg Luce Talks About the Relationship Between Legal Counsel
and Compliance Seasoned Veteran Discusses How Compliance Has Evolved and What
It Takes to Be Effective, 9 J. OFHEALTHCARECOMPLIANCE 31, 34–5 (2007).
89. See generally id.
